Keeping the Genie in the Bottle: Grading the Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions by Chant, John F.
www.policyschool.ca
Volume 7 • Issue 8 • March 2014
KEEPING THE GENIE IN THE
BOTTLE: GRADING THE
REGULATION OF CANADIAN
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
John F. Chant†
Emeritus Professor of Economics, Simon Fraser University
SUMMARY
The Canadian financial sector made it through the recent global credit crisis in better shape than most.
Still the government undertook extraordinary measures to support the soundness of Canadian financial
institutions. Fortunately, Canadians learned the lessons of the world banking crisis at lower cost than
others. They may not be so lucky the next time.
Canada’s approach to regulation includes many features that have been effective in insulating its financial
sector from major shocks. Its principles-based approach has proven more adaptable to emerging financial
innovations than the rules-based approaches as adopted in the U.S. By favouring permission over
prohibition, it has allowed beneficial financial innovations to thrive, while leaving regulators able to step in
when innovations appear harmful to the stability of the system. On the whole, Canada’s regulatory
approach is, put simply, simpler and reduces the costs of compliance and enforcement. Significantly, it has
remained immune from the toxic political influences that overshadow U.S. regulation.
None of this guarantees that the Canadian approach to regulation is fail-proof. The Canadian financial
sector has a few large banks – some with assets ranging up to 50% of GDP – who could be categorized
as “too big to fail.” Deposit insurance rates remain low and insurer’s reserves are not sufficient to shield
the Canadian public from the costs of institutional failure. 
Despite the good job in fostering a stable environment, Canadian regulators must still face a number of
issues. Each financial crisis is different and future crises are always over the horizon. Success in avoiding
the brunt of the last crisis does not guarantee that Canadian financial institutions will escape unscathed
from the next one. Also, fast paced innovation puts regulators in a continual game of catch-up. The rapid
growth of shadow banks and over-the-counter derivatives contributed to the last crisis and the issues
they raise have yet to be resolved. 
Finally, the success of international efforts to reverse “too big to fail” by allowing troubled financial
institutions to fail safely cannot be assured. It requires authorities to close failing institutions promptly
but history suggests that delay may appeal to regulators. They may hope that an institution, if given time,
can recover. They may also fear fuelling a financial crisis by repeating the distress unleashed by the
failures in the last crisis. With no chance for a trial run, regulators may be forced to bailout failing
institutions in the heat of a crisis. To prevent such an outcome, regulators must strengthen measures to
ensure that major institutions are too safe to fail.
† The author is indebted to participants at the Financial Markets Regulation Roundtable, Jack Mintz and two
anonymous referees for their useful comments.
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RÉSUMÉ
Le secteur financier canadien s’en est mieux tiré que la plupart lors de la récente crise mondiale du crédit. Le 
gouvernement a néanmoins pris des mesures extraordinaires pour soutenir la solidité des institutions financières 
canadiennes. Fort heureusement, les Canadiens ont moins pâti que d’autres des leçons tirées de cette crise, mais ils 
ne seront peut-être pas aussi chanceux la prochaine fois.
La stratégie du Canada en matière de réglementation comprend de nombreuses caractéristiques qui ont prémuni 
efficacement son secteur financier contre de graves bouleversements. Son approche axée sur des principes s’est 
avérée plus adaptable aux innovations financières que l’approche américaine fondée sur des règles. En mettant 
l’accent sur la permission plutôt que sur l’interdiction, elle a valorisé les innovations financières bénéfiques, tout 
en permettant aux organismes de réglementation d’intervenir lorsque des innovations menaçaient la stabilité du 
système. En bref, l’approche réglementaire canadienne est plus simple et moins coûteuse à appliquer et respecter 
que celle des États-Unis. Elle est également à l’abri de considérations politiques comme celles qui ont pris le dessus 
sur la réglementation américaine.
Cependant, rien de tout cela ne garantit l’infaillibilité de la stratégie de réglementation canadienne. Le secteur 
financier canadien comprend quelques grandes banques — dont certaines détiennent des actifs équivalant à 50 % 
du PIB — qui pourraient être caractérisées de « trop importantes pour faire faillite ». Les taux d’assurance-dépôts 
demeurent faibles et les provisions de l’assureur ne suffisent pas à préserver le public canadien des coûts d’une 
faillite institutionnelle.
Les organismes de réglementation ont réussi à favoriser un environnement stable, mais ils doivent encore résoudre 
un certain nombre de problèmes. Chaque crise financière est différente et d’autres se dessinent à l’horizon. Le 
fait d’avoir évité le choc de la dernière crise n’est en rien un gage que les institutions financières canadiennes 
sortiront indemnes de la prochaine. En outre, le rythme effréné des innovations met constamment les organismes 
de réglementation en mode de rattrapage. La croissance rapide des banques parallèles et des produits dérivés de 
gré à gré a alimenté la dernière crise et les problèmes qu’elle soulève n’ont pas encore été résolus.
Enfin, l’aboutissement des démarches internationales visant à inverser la logique des « sociétés trop grandes pour 
faire faillite », en permettant aux institutions financières en difficulté de faire faillite en toute sécurité, demeure 
incertain. Il faudrait que les autorités ferment rapidement les institutions chancelantes; cependant, les organismes 
de réglementation ont généralement plutôt tendance à retarder la fermeture de ces institutions, dans l’espoir 
qu’elles récupèrent. Il se peut également que les autorités redoutent d’aggraver la crise financière, en ranimant la 
détresse provoquée par les faillites lors de la dernière crise. Faute de pouvoir mettre à l’essai les nouvelles mesures, 
les organismes de réglementation pourraient être contraints, au plus fort de la crise, d’effectuer le sauvetage des 
institutions en difficulté. Pour éviter pareil scénario, ces organismes doivent renforcer des mesures faisant en sorte 
que les grandes institutions soient trop sûres pour faire faillite.
† 
L’auteur remercie de leurs commentaires pertinents les participants de la table ronde sur la réglementation des marchés 
financiers, Jack Mintz et deux lecteurs anonymes.
INTRODUCTION
The influence of the financial crisis that started in 2007 still looms over financial markets today
and calls attention to the crucial role of regulation in ensuring the success of the financial
industry. The vast literature that has been focused on the problems faced by the U.K., U.S. and
Europe may seem less relevant to Canada where markets were less troubled and the strings of
failures and troubled banks elsewhere were avoided. Canadian banks navigated the crisis better
during the crisis because of our banks’ reliance on stable funding and their avoidance of dubious
activities. Nevertheless, Canadian authorities did resort to extraordinary measures to support the
banks. Canadians should be thankful that they learned the lessons of the world banking crisis at
lower costs than others, but they should not be complacent in believing that they’ll be so
fortunate the next time.
This paper will provide a report card for Canadian financial regulation using a number of
measures: Is regulation keeping pace with the moving target posed by rapid changes in the
financial industry? How has it managed the trade-offs that arise between the competing goals of
safety and efficiency? Inevitably the paper will emphasize banks relative to other financial
institutions because of their significance to the economy and the greater sensitivity of banks to
market developments.  
WHAT DO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS DO? 
Financial institutions are among the most heavily regulated entities in developed economies.
Any assessment of regulation must reflect an understanding of the activities of these institutions
that lead to this degree of regulation.  
The term “financial institution” covers a broad range of entities, including banks, credit unions,
life insurance companies, property and casualty insurance companies and investment (mutual)
and pension funds (Table 1). They share the feature that they take other people’s money in
exchange for promises to make future payments. Unlike the alchemists of old, they succeed in
turning dross into gold by transforming the qualities of financial assets by offering claims that
their customers value more than the underlying assets. Different types of financial institutions
transform financial assets and liabilities in different ways (Table 2). Banking-type institutions —
banks, caisses/credit unions and money market funds — perform this alchemy by holding assets
that are less liquid and less certain in value than the liquid, fixed-value claims they issue.1 Life
insurers, property insurers and defined-benefit pension funds create the transformation through
offering assured payments against the occurrence of events whose timing and size are
unpredictable at the individual level (death, sickness, injury, damage, etc.) against assets whose
maturity is independent of the these events. Investment funds such as mutual funds and defined-
contribution pension funds transform risk by offering their investors a share of a portfolio of
assets that is less risky than its components individually. 
1 The inclusion of money market funds among banking institutions reflects investors’ expectations that the value of the
funds is fixed. Technically, these funds are not fixed-value in all circumstances. Commonly their prospectus will state:
“the Fund intends to maintain a consistent price, but there is no guarantee that its price will not go up or down.”
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TABLE 1: ASSETS OF CANADIAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 2012) 
Sources: Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI); Bank of Canada; Longworth, 
“Combatting the Dangers,” Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation Corporation; 
and GlobeInvestor.com.
Note: Dates may not coincide exactly.
1. Refers to OSFI-regulated companies that account for about 70 per cent of the property and casualty 
companies in Canada.
2. Refers to a corporate group of funds.
TABLE 2: ACTIVITIES AND RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Financial institutions also perform a vital function on the asset side of their business by
directing finance toward different users of funds. In addition, financial institutions, banks
especially, participate in non-traditional activities such as buying and writing derivative
securities that promise to make payments under specified contingencies. Banks also own
Canada’s largest investment dealers, who participate in brokerage and underwriting activities. 
Confidence and trust are crucial to making this alchemy succeed. If this confidence breaks
down, the business of these institutions will be put at risk. The source of confidence in
financial institutions is generically the same: customers must be convinced that the institutions
will meet their obligations. The specifics, however, differ. Deposit-taking institutions and
investment funds with fixed obligations must manage a portfolio that is opaque to outsiders in
a way that keeps their short-term claims in place; insurers must price their underwriting so that
they can meet their claims; and investment funds must convince customers that their
investments are properly managed.
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Sector size 3,849 292 49 26 968 97 756
Largest entity in sector 859 16 n/a 3 486 11 1182
Banks
Credit
unions and
caisses
populaire
Trust and
mortgage-
loan
companies
Money
mutual
funds
Life
Insurers
Property
and
casualty
insurers1
Mutual
fundsType of institution
Banking institutions Investment
funds
Insurers
Institutions Assets Liabilities Sources of 
institutional risk 
Banks, Caisses populaire and
Credit unions, Money market mutual
funds
Life insurers, 
Pension funds (defined benefit) 
Mutual funds,
Exchange-traded funds,
Pension funds (defined contribution) 
Property and casualty insurers
Longer term than liabilities,
Uncertain,
Illiquid,
Opaque
Long term,
Uncertain,
Illiquid
Varied term
Varied term
Fixed value,
Short term
Fixed value,
Long term,
Uncertain timing
Share of assets
Event dependent
Maturity mismatch,
Uncertainty of asset value
Claim risk,
Asset value,
Underwriting risk
Pass through
Asset value,
Underwriting risk
3The different financial institutions suffer differently from a loss of customer confidence:  
• A loss of confidence for a bank would precipitate a sharp and sudden run, where depositors and
short-term creditors rush to withdraw their funds. Given their dependence on short-term
funding, banks can collapse quickly, even if they could be fundamentally sound in the long run.
• Life insurers would experience a more gradual and prolonged downward spiral as they are
unable to attract new business, face demands for policy loans, and experience a shrinkage
of premium revenues. Their impairment may be less evident immediately because the bulk
of their claims come due far into the future.2
• Traditional property and casualty insurers would face a drop in both renewals and new
business. Since much of their business is short term, the resulting drop in revenues will
push them toward failure quickly. 
• A loss of confidence in investment funds would produce a more orderly shrinkage as
investors are entitled to a proportionate share of the funds’ assets rather than a fixed
payment, and have less incentive to be first in line. Runs could happen, however, if
customers suspect fraud through the diversion of assets, such as schemes linked to the
names of Ponzi, Cornfeld, Madoff and in Canada, Portus. 
The costs of failures would be borne directly by the customers of the institutions were it not for
the presence of a safety net of guarantees. These arrangements reflect the nature of the risks
and scale of each type of financial institution (Table 3).3 Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
(CDIC), the guarantor for banking-type institutions, has substantial pre-paid funding together
with access to government support. The resources of Assuris, the guarantor for life and health
insurers, and the Property and Casualty Insurance Compensation Corporation (PACICC) are
smaller and are intended to meet liquidity needs. Neither has access to government support.  
TABLE 3: CUSTOMER-GUARANTEE PLANS
2 See: R. McQueen, Who Killed Confederation Life? The Inside Story (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996), for a
narrative of the failure of a large life insurer.
3 Provincial institutions, such as caisses/credit unions, are covered to differing degrees by provincial guarantee funds
backed up by CDIC support.
CDIC Assuris PACICC 
Federally regulated Life and health Property and casualty 
Industry deposit-taking institutions insurers insurers 
Coverage
Assets (millions)
Fees (millions)
Expenses (millions)
Borrowing powers
$100,000 per account
$2,441
$224
$32
Maximum $18-billion line of
credit from CDIC
Death — $200,000
Health — $60,000
Monthly income — $2,000
Cash value — $60,000
Or 85 per cent, whichever is greater
$122
$1.5
$5.6
Yes
Auto and commercial —
$250,000
Home — $300,000
$66
$1.2
$1.5
Yes
The differences among institutions justify differences in their regulation: 
• Property and casualty insurance failures have been frequent, with some 32 since 1989, and
are resolved at little cost. The six failures that took place between 2000 and 2005 were
settled at less than $4 million each.4
• Only four life insurers have failed since 1990, of which three have now been resolved at an
average cost of $60 million.5
• The losses are much greater for failures of banking-type institutions. The Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation (CDIC) provided a $2.4 billion guarantee in the 1980s to support a
bank’s takeover of a failing trust and loan company. Three of the last four bank failures, all
small, received $1.4 to $5.2 billion support each from the Bank of Canada.6
WHY REGULATE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS?
The need for regulation
This need for regulation of financial institutions has long been recognized by economists, from
Adam Smith in the 1700s to Walter Bagehot in the 1800s, to modern-day theorists. Many have
warned of the fragility inherent in financial institutions, especially banking. On the theoretical
side, the work of Diamond and Dybvig has been a staple of graduate courses in monetary
theory for more than 25 years.7 Friedman and Schwartz documented the collapse of the U.S.
banking system in the 1930s and its consequences in their monumental monetary history of the
United States.8
Underlying the concerns about banking stability is the principle that, by issuing short-term debt
in the form of deposits against longer-term illiquid and opaque assets, banks will be inherently
fragile, relying as they do on the confidence of their depositors to be viable. This confidence
can be eroded by depositors’ concerns, based on the actual condition of the institution, or by
concerns based on faulty perceptions. Both can induce a run on a bank where depositors rush
to withdraw their funds that can bring down the bank, whether it was initially sound or not.  
Economists’ concerns about stability of financial institutions go beyond the viability of single
institutions. They have long realized that the troubles of one institution can spread, and cast
uncertainty about the conditions of others. The fragility that characterizes individual banks
applies to the banking system as a whole.  
4 P. Kovacs, “Lessons learned from insolvency in the Canadian P&C insurance industry” (Presentation to the Canadian
Institute for Actuaries, June 2012).
5 Assuris, Annual Report, 2011.
6 R. Shearer, J. Chant and D. Bond, The Economics of the Canadian Financial System: Theory, Policy & Institutions
2nd edition (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 659. 
7 D. Diamond and P. Dybvig, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,” Journal of Political Economy (June
1983): 401-419. 
8 M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963).
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Remedy versus prevention
The term “regulation” itself may be negative to many who ask “why can’t governments leave
us alone to carry out our business?” Still, it must be recognized that economic activity in a
market economy is embedded in a legal system of which regulation is only a part. The system
includes preventive measures intended to deter actions that cause harm together with remedial
measures that determine liability for the harm once it occurs.9
Regulation is an important element of the preventive aspect of the legal system through
constraining or limiting parties’ actions in order to prevent harm from occurring. The remedial
part of the legal system is tort liability, which deals with harms after they have occurred. This
part of the legal system defines the recourse available to harmed parties when, among other
things, their property rights are violated, when others breach their contractual commitments, or
when they are damaged by the actions of others.
Factors influencing the choice between remedy and prevention include:
1. differences in knowledge,
2. ability to pay for the full magnitude of harm,
3. possibility (or threat) of suit for harm done.10
Each of these factors has relevance for the financial industry.
1. DIFFERENCE IN KNOWLEDGE
Financial institutions exist because their customers have delegated the management of risks to
them in order to avoid duplicating effort, were the customers to manage risks themselves. Just
as there are economies for institutions in monitoring specific risks, so too are there economies
in assessing and monitoring the risks of financial institutions. Thus, differences in knowledge
can support a collective role in overseeing financial institutions through regulation and
supervision.
2. ABILITY TO COMPENSATE
The fact that financial institutions hold claims on financial rather than concrete assets
undermines the usefulness of compensation as a remedy for harm, because the value of these
claims depends on the institution’s monitoring and its accumulated experience with the issuers.
The transfer of these assets to others without this experience would diminish the assets’ value.
The effectiveness of compensation is further limited because financial institutions tend to be
highly levered: their owners’ stake may be insufficient to provide compensation when the
institution’s asset values fall short of its obligations. The combination of the types of assets
held, and the high levels of leverage, both limit the prospects of compensation for harm and tilt
the balance toward preventive regulation.
9 For the origins of this distinction, see: S. Shavell “Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety,” Journal of Legal
Studies 13 (June 1984): 357-374; and S. Shavell, “A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, ”
Rand Journal of Economics 15, 2 (Summer 1984): 271-280. 
10 Shavell, “Liability for,” 359-363.
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3. THREAT OF SUIT
Financial institutions by their nature tend to have a large number of creditors, each with a
relatively small stake. A suit by any individual creditor to recover its losses would be too costly
to be justified by the returns. Collective action through regulation may be necessary to protect
creditors’ interests to a degree unnecessary in many other economic activities.  
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN BRIEF
The financial crisis that started in 2007 casts a shadow over any attempt to assess financial
regulation. The root of the crisis was the securitization of U.S. sub-prime residential
mortgages, a process through which the party that originated the mortgages sold them onward
in packages to others. In the right conditions, securitization can be beneficial by allowing
specialization between initiating a loan and funding it. The superstructure built on sub-prime
mortgages was weakened by some parties pursuing an “acquire-to-sell” strategy whereby they
purchased mortgage packages not to hold, but rather to sell them onward combined with other
mortgage packages. This greatly diluted the accountability of mortgage initiators to the
ultimate investors. Initiators responded in many cases by lowering their lending standards to
keep new mortgages flowing. Many investors, leery of the structured arrangements, protected
themselves by buying derivatives that would pay off if their securitized-mortgage holdings
turned bad. The sub-prime mortgage market was transformed from a simple market to a
complicated and opaque one.
The first signs of the crisis emerged in the summer of 2007, when warnings and rating
downgrades from credit-rating agencies for many mortgage-based securities were quickly
followed by difficulties and even failures of specialized mortgage institutions. These alarms
strengthened in the autumn, when the Bank of England was forced to give emergency support
to Northern Rock Bank to offset its loss of funding. Other financial institutions found it
increasingly difficult to maintain their short-term funding. Despite measures by the U.S.
Federal Reserve to lower its target rates from 6.25 per cent in August 2007 to 2.00 per cent in
April 2008, and to grant an unprecedented amount of financial assistance over a broader range
of institutions than ever before, the pressures strengthened and continued to spread. 
By September 2008, many major financial institutions came under pressure and either required
government assistance, were merged with others, or were placed into government
conservatorship.11 However, Lehman Brothers, a major investment bank, was not rescued and
was allowed to fail, causing a major blow to confidence. Throughout the autumn, the
government was forced to introduce multiple interventions, including the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), which purchased capital in troubled financial institutions, and the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program, which guaranteed their uninsured deposits and senior debt.
TARP assistance was soon extended beyond banks to insurance companies and even to car
makers.
11 The list includes Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two bulwarks of housing finance; Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch,
two major investment banks; Wachovia Bank; and the U.K.’s Black Rock Financial, among others. 
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The crisis abated in 2009, but not before leaving a legacy of 400 failed banks and “hundreds of
billions of dollars of capital and over a trillion dollars of emergency loans” injected by the U.S.
government to financial institutions.12 The crisis was not confined to the U.S.: it also eventually
entailed the rescue of three of the largest banks in the U.K., including the world’s largest bank,
the Royal Bank of Scotland, together with major banks in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
Ireland, among others.
The impact on Canada
At the early stages of the financial crisis, Canada experienced a crisis of its own in the asset-
based commercial paper (ABCP) market, where specialized entities (conduits) financed
holdings of mortgage-backed securities, or derivatives based on them, through issues of short-
term commercial paper, mainly from large institutional investors.13 In August 2007, investors
withheld funding from conduits over concern about the deteriorating condition of the U.S. sub-
prime market. While Canadian banks supported their sponsored conduits, the non-bank or
third-party conduits, accounting for $32 billion of the $117-billion ABCP market, were unable
to roll over their maturing notes. A committee consisting of large investors and other interested
parties agreed to a 60-day standstill to allow for a restructuring of non-bank ABCP. After
prolonged negotiations, small investors were reimbursed, while other investors received
substitute notes that matched the classes of assets underlying their conduits. These notes have
been actively traded at varying discounts from their face value and some have now been rated
by a Canadian rating agency. 
Canadian financial institutions did not escape the financial crisis unscathed. The market value of
the Big Six Canadian banks fell by 44 per cent in the two years following the start of the crisis.
Canadian authorities responded to prevent the spread of the crisis with measures that included:
• Larger and more frequent purchase-and-resale agreements (PRAs) by the Bank of Canada;14
• Creation of new longer-term credit facilities from the Bank of Canada;
• Acceptance of a broadened range of collateral for borrowings by the Bank of Canada;
• Offer of government guarantees to financial institutions for new issues of unsecured
wholesale debt up to either 120 per cent of wholesale debt or 20 per cent of deposits on an
optional basis;15
• Purchase of up to $75 billion of insured mortgages from financial institutions by the
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation.16
12 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Financial Regulatory Reform: Financial Crisis Losses and the Potential
Impacts of the Dodd-Frank Act (Washington: January 16, 2013), 1.  
13 For details, see: John Chant, “Appendix: The ABCP Crisis in Canada: the Implications for the Regulation of
Financial Market,” in David Johnston, Kathleen Rockwell and Cristie Ford, Securities Regulation in Canada 5th ed.
(Markham: LexisNexis, forthcoming 2014).
14 PRAs are arrangements where financial institutions gain liquidity by selling securities to the central bank against
their promise to buy them back at a later date.      
15 In the event, financial institutions did not make use of the program. Still, the program strengthened confidence in the
financial institutions because the offer of a guarantee is in itself a guarantee to the outside world.
16 For more details, see: Bank of Canada, The Macroeconomic Environment, Financial System Review (December
2008), 13, Table 1.
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While these measures were less drastic than those in other countries, they dwarfed any
previous measures taken to support Canada’s banks. Still, Canada experienced a lesser impact
on the stability of its banks and the rest of financial system than what occurred in most other
countries, earning many plaudits for the soundness of the Canadian banking system.
The costs of the crisis
A financial crisis imposes substantial economic costs on the economy. Distributional costs
consist of the costs borne by the government in supporting and winding up troubled
institutions. Distributional costs of the financial crisis can be substantial and result from capital
injections, asset purchases and guarantees by governments and their agencies, and central-bank
support. These costs shift the losses of financial institutions from their stakeholders, leaving the
public to pick up the tab. The real economic costs of financial crisis consist of the consequent
losses of output and wealth. A U.S. government study estimates that the total losses from the
financial crisis will total $5 trillion by 2018, while academic economists suggest that these
costs range from 36 to 45 per cent of the base-year GDP.17,18 The U.S. Government Accounting
Office suggests these estimates are conservative because they do not include other costs such
as the effects on long-term unemployment, household wealth and the disruptions arising from
foreclosures.19
These estimates may not reflect the costs of a domestic financial crisis confined to Canada.
Canada’s deep ties with the U.S. could serve as a buffer that would moderate the extent of such
a crisis. These same ties, however, make Canada vulnerable to the U.S. economy, so its
financial institutions need to be braced to deal with the spillovers from the U.S.
LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Sources of runs
The bank runs of the 2007–09 crisis differed from the classic bank runs of the past in that they
were caused not by retail depositors, but by holders of wholesale claims. A recent study
showed that the funding structures of large banks explain the degree to which they were
affected by the crisis.20 Banks that relied on non-depository funds suffered greater declines in
equity value than did other banks. The study concluded that “depository funding significantly
and robustly explains bank performance during the credit turmoil.”21 Banks that relied more
heavily on retail deposits, such as those in Canada, did better than those that did not.
17 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Financial Regulatory, 12-18.
18 John H. Boyd and Amanda Heitz , “The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-To-Fail Banks: A Bounding Exercise”
(University of Minnesota, Draft, August 2011), used the methods developed in the classic article on the costs of
financial crises by  J. Boyd, S. Kwak and B. Smith, “The Real Output Losses Associated with Modern Banking
Crises,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37 (2005): 977-999. 
19 U.S. Government Accounting Office, Financial Regulatory, 17.
20 See: L. Ratnovski and R. Huang, “Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?” International Monetary Fund
WP/09/152 (2009).    
21 ibid.
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A significant new element in the banking crisis was the widespread weakness of U.S. non-
banking institutions such as Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers; the mortgage
lenders such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; the insurer American International Group (AIG);
and even industrial corporations such as General Electric.22,23 These so-called shadow banks
transform assets in the same way as regulated financial institutions. Some perform maturity
transformation by issuing short-term claims to fund longer-term commitments, while others
issue fixed-value claims against risky assets. Like regulated financial institutions, they can be
imperilled by liquidity shortages when their funding dries up. The experience of these entities
showed that they share the same characteristics as banks: they could be fragile enough, large
enough and interconnected enough to threaten the stability of the financial system. 
Complexity and interconnectedness
The financial crisis highlighted the degree of mutual dependence among financial institutions
in that the viability of one institution can depend on the conditions of others. The channels for
these interdependencies include:
• Painting with the same brush:
Given the limited ability of customers to assess the soundness of what backs their own
financial institution, difficulties at other institutions may raise doubts about their own
institution and subject it to a run. The failures of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers at the
early stages of the crisis spread doubts to other institutions, drying up their sources of funds
and taking the crisis to new levels.
• Dependency chains:
Financial institutions are often exposed to the risk that their counterparties — for example, in
markets such as the interbank funding market, derivative markets, and credit-default swaps —
do not deliver on their commitments. Moreover, these counterparties may themselves be
exposed to other counterparties, creating a chain of exposure with the potential to produce a
domino effect where one institution’s problems spread to others, even those without direct
dealings with it. Indeed, it was these dependencies that forced the U.S. government into a $180-
billion rescue of the insurer AIG because its failure would weaken not only on its
counterparties, but also the counterparties’ counterparties, who had no direct dealings with AIG.  
• Fire sales:
Fire sales arise because different financial institutions hold similar assets. While a single
troubled institution could sell its assets with little effect on market prices, this possibility
disappears when numerous institutions try to sell the same assets at the same time, pushing
prices downward, devaluing their holdings and intensifying their difficulties. Fire sales can
even lead to market freezes that shut down asset markets entirely.
22 Like financial corporations, GE received a government guarantee — in this case, $126 billion — to bolster investor
confidence in GE’s outstanding commercial paper.
23 The experience of Long-Term Capital Management exhibited a similar threat in 1998, the lessons of which were not
heeded.
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Traditionally, financial regulation has been concerned primarily with the safety and soundness
of individual institutions, especially banks. Accordingly, economists have recommended
moving beyond policies aimed at protecting the safety of single institutions or types of
institutions toward macroprudential policy directed at protecting the financial sector as a
whole.24
Impact on the safety net
The crisis challenged the elements of the existing safety net. While in normal times, deposit
insurers deal with a few institutions that run into trouble, financial authorities had to deal with
events well outside the range of normal experience. The crisis, as it progressed, proved to be
more than something that could be solved through infusions of more liquidity. The crisis
became a crisis of confidence, where the solvency of some of the world’s largest financial
institutions came into question. As was the case in the Continental Illinois episode of the
1980s, large banks that depended on wholesale sources of funds suffered substantial losses of
deposits, shaking confidence in the entire banking system. As the crisis spread, the threats
posed by non-banking institutions, and the complex interconnectedness among financial
institutions and other enterprises, led authorities to take extraordinary measures. Since their
wind up of large, troubled institutions could not be managed smoothly in the heat of the
moment, authorities expanded short-term lending facilities, extended the range of assets
eligible for collateral, increased deposit-insurance limits, guaranteed bank liabilities,
contributed to bank capital and purchased assets, including impaired assets, from financial
institutions. In some cases, they bolstered financial enterprises that lay outside the domain of
regulation and the safety net.  
Changed expectations
The expansion of the safety net during the crisis passed a milestone comparable to the
initiation of deposit insurance in the 1930s, the acceptance of “too big to fail” in the 1980s and
the 1998 bailout of Long-term Capital Management. The extraordinary measures taken in each
case raise expectations regarding the support for troubled institutions. As the margin of support
expands, the exceptional can soon become the normal, with financial institutions following the
margin and accepting higher levels of risk.25 In the aftermath of the crisis, authorities must deal
with the consequences of a perception of an expanded safety net in addition to any weaknesses
revealed by the crisis itself.   
24 Borio and White were pioneers in asserting this need. See: C. Borio and W. White, “Whither Monetary and Financial
Stabilization: The Implications of Existing Policy Regimes” (Presented at “Monetary Policy and Uncertainty:
Adapting to a Changing Economy,” Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, August 28 -
30, 2003), http://www.kc.frb.org/publications/research/escp/escp-2003.cfm.
25 A large literature has documented the effects of deposit insurance on banks’ risk taking. For example, in a study of
61 countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiach find that the introduction of deposit insurance was detrimental to bank
stability. A. Demirguc-Kunt and E. Detragiach “Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?” (IMF
Working Paper WP/00/03, January 2000).
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THE FRAMEWORK FOR PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The content of a country’s financial regulation should not be judged in isolation from its
institutional setting, because the same regulations can have different outcomes in different
circumstances. Instead, judgment should be based on the institutional arrangements that govern
the financial regulation’s formulation and modification in addition to the ways it is
administered and enforced.26
The effectiveness of the institutional arrangements governing financial regulation will be
influenced by:
• The goals chosen for regulators
• The independence of regulators from outside pressures
• Their accountability with respect to responsibility
• Their adaptability to changing conditions
• Simplicity
Goals
Financial institutions have been governed by regulations with objectives ranging from safety
and soundness on the one hand, to national control and social objectives on the other (Table 4).
The objectives of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), as set out in
its governing act, are clearly directed at safety and soundness: it is to assure that financial
institutions are in sound financial condition and are compliant with their governing laws and
statutory requirements.27 Further, it is “to protect the rights and interests of depositors,
policyholders, and creditors of financial institutions, having due regard to the need to allow
financial institutions to compete effectively and take reasonable risks.”28
TABLE 4: TYPES OF REGULATION GOVERNING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
26 Table 5 outlines the agencies responsible for regulating different financial institutions.
27 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act, Section 4(2).
28 ibid., Section 4(3)(a).  
Type of regulation Objective Examples
Prudential
Market conduct
Price regulation
Social objectives
National objectives
Competition and market
structure
Anti-money laundering
U.S. tax policy
Safety and soundness of financial institutions
System stability
Governs the relationship between institutions
and customers
Sets limits to the prices charged to customers
Directs actions toward specific activities or
groups 
Promote national control 
Foster competitive markets
Prevent transfer of funds for terrorism and
illegal activity
Compliance with tax regime
Capital and liquidity requirements
Limits to concentrated ownership
Codes of conduct (credit/debit cards)
Insurance-rate ceilings
Regulation Q (U.S. ceiling on deposit rates)
Community Reinvestment Act (U.S.)
Access to service guidelines
Foreign-ownership limits
Director requirements
Prohibition of bank mergers
Limits to concentrated ownership
Screening of money transfers
Reporting about financial accounts
Financial authorities have, at different times, pursued additional goals, including provisions
limiting foreign participation in banking29 and provincial authorities, and to a lesser degree,
federal authorities, have developed market-conduct rules for financial institutions that govern
their relations with their customers.
Canadian authorities have avoided using financial regulation for achieving social objectives
such as housing, unlike in the U.S. where institutions must meet targets in order to gain
regulatory approvals.30 Policies such as the Community Reinvestment Act in the U.S.
contributed to the crisis by pressuring banks to expand housing credit, leading them to make
riskier loans that were more likely to become delinquent.31
TABLE 5: AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE FOR REGULATION AND GUARANTEE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
29 A prohibition on foreign banking introduced in 1967 has been gradually eased from 1980 onward.
30 Forcing financial institutions to invest in housing finance is a hidden form of taxation, the burden of which falls on
the institutions and their customers.
31 S. Agarwal et al., “Did the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Lead to Riskier Lending?” (NBER Working Paper
18609).
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Authority Role Powers
Department of Finance
Bank of Canada
Office of the Supervisor of
Financial Institutions
Investment Industry Regulatory
Agency of Canada
Financial Transactions and
reports Analysis Centre of Canada  
Canada Deposit Insurance
Corporation
Assuris
Property and Casualty Insurance 
Compensation Corporation
Canadian Securities
Administrators
Provincial regulators
Provincial guarantee funds
Policy formation
Monetary policy
Assuring safety and soundness of
federal financial institutions 
Regulation of market conduct in
securities markets
Prevention of money laundering and
financing of terrorists
Insures deposits at banks and federal
trust companies
Insures policies of life insurance
companies
Insures policies of property- and
casualty-insurance companies
Oversees securities activities of federal
institutions
Assuring the safety and soundness of
provincial institutions
Insure deposits at caisses/credit unions
Policy advice with respect to legislative
changes and orders in council
Establishes framework for regulation
Oversees five-year reviews of financial
legislation
Lender of last resort
Regulator of payments system
Regulates and supervises major financial
institutions
Administers OSFI Act, Bank Act and other
federal legislation
Sets terms for deposit insurance
Participates in the resolution of failed
institutions
Participates in the resolution of failed
institutions
Participates in the resolution of failed
institutions
Sets reporting standards for financial
transactions
Regulate and supervise provincial
institutions
Set terms for deposit insurance
Participate in the resolution of failed
institutions
Independence
The degree of independence that financial regulators have from the pressures of political and
business interests will affect their performance. Nominally, these regulators are organized in
industrialized countries as stand-alone entities separate from the rest of government in order to
insulate them from such outside pressures. 
The major financial regulators in Canada, namely OSFI, CDIC and provincial securities
regulators, have been established as independent agencies in much the same way as their
counterparts in the U.S., with one exception. Technically the minister of finance “by statute
‘presides over’ and ‘is responsible for’ OSFI, while the Superintendent is the deputy head of
the office.”32 In addition, the deputy finance minister is an ex officio member of both key
committees concerned with the supervision of financial institutions and financial-sector policy
issues, and the minister of finance has the power to reject interventions by Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation to resolve failing institutions, although this power has not been used.
De facto independence from outside pressures, however, is more than a matter of institutional
form. While Canadian agencies may appear less independent than their U.S. counterparts,
senior levels of U.S. agencies, for example, are staffed by political appointees, who move
through a revolving door when there are changes in government.33 Many are drawn from, and
will return to, the financial industry. Canadian agencies, in contrast, are staffed mainly by
career civil servants with much less movement back and forth with the financial industry.
Differences in independence may also occur with respect to responsibility for the development
of financial rules. Legislation in the U.S. is developed in the House and the Senate, and their
respective committees, where the members are targets for vigorous lobbying and receive
substantial campaign support from interest groups.34 Legislators can also offer amendments
reflecting their specific interests in return for their overall support for the proposals. Canadian
legislation, in contrast, is developed in the Department of Finance and is then presented to the
legislature with assured support from the governing party.35
32 J. Crow, “Seeking Financial Stability: The Best Role for the Bank of Canada,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 369
(December 13, 2012): 7.
33 See J. Barth, G. Caprio, and R. Levine, Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators for Us (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 2012), 208-10.
34 The Center for Responsive Politics reports that the Finance/Insurance/Real Estate industry spent $482 million on
lobbying in 2012 and a further $492 million in campaign contributions over the 2012 electoral cycle. Accessed at
OpenSecrets.com, March 10, 2013.
35 Calomiris and Harden contrast the politicized environment that characterizes financial regulation in the U.S. with that
of Canada, and attributes the different environment in Canada to the British desire to centralize powers with the
federal government. See the presentation based on their forthcoming book: Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen Haber,
Fragile by Design: Banking Crises, Scarce Credit, and Political Bargains (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press), http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Calomiris-Haber-notes-20120612.pdf.
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Accountability
The place of the financial regulators’ organization within the governing apparatus will
determine the degree to which they are accountable for their performance. In some countries,
including the U.S. and the U.K., some or all responsibility for financial regulation lies with the
central bank rather than with a separate agency.  
This consolidation of responsibilities within a single agency has been defended on the basis
that the information derived from each of these activities can be vital to the others.36 Indeed,
the Financial Services Authority of the U.K. has suggested that a lack of information sharing
between regulatory and supervisory authorities there delayed the response to the emerging
financial crisis.37 Canadian authorities have compensated for the separation of functions by
establishing the Financial Institutions Steering Committee (FISC), a high-level inter-agency
committee organized “to facilitate consultations and the exchange of information ... on all
matters relating directly to the supervision of financial institutions.”38,39 The terms of FISC
state that any member must make available, on request from the other members, any
information related to the supervision of financial institutions.40 The auditor general of Canada
has concluded that the FISC arrangement has worked well for the exchange of information and
as a forum for addressing a range of issues, from financial stability to international and
domestic regulatory developments.41 
The assignment of responsibilities to separate agencies has a key advantage over giving
multiple responsibilities to a single agency: assessment of the single agency will be
complicated by the need to account for performance of multiple, and possibly competing,
goals. In particular, it will be difficult to distinguish whether the agency’s failure to achieve a
goal resulted from the placing of more emphasis on other goals or just poor performance. The
arrangements in Canada, where monetary policy is assigned to the central banks and prudential
regulation to regulatory authorities, avoids the problem by providing clear accountability for
each function.
36 See: J. Peek, E. Rosengren and G. Tootell, “Is Bank Supervision Central To Central Banking?” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114, 2 (May 1999): 629-653. Recently, the head of another Federal Reserve Bank has argued
the opposite position, urging that the Fed’s responsibilities be confined to a single goal to ensure clearer
accountability. See: C. Plosser, “A Limited Central Bank” (Speech presented at Cato Institute’s 31st Annual
Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/publications/speeches/plosser/2013/11-13-13_cato-institute.pdf.
37 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007–08,
Volume I (January 2008), paragraph 276.
38 OSFI Act 18(3).
39 The senior advisory committee, which shares the same composition as FISC and is chaired by the deputy minister of
finance, provides a forum for discussing longer-term policy issues such as legislative changes and the regulatory and
supervisory framework.
40 OSFI Act 18(4).
41 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2010 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 5: “Regulating and
Supervising Large Banks” (2010).
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Adaptability
Past experience shows that financial markets can change quickly through changes in the
processes used and the services supplied. “You have to think about regulation as an arms race,”
said the chief economist at the Bank for International Settlements. “So every day, the banks
wake up looking for a way around it. And the regulators and the supervisors look for a way to
try to contain the next thing they do.”42 To keep up in this race, regulators must be able to
respond quickly to market developments.  
The Canadian approach to regulation incorporates adaptability in a number of ways. At the
simplest level, the guidelines issued by the superintendent are predominately principles-based
rather than rules-based, offering institutions flexibility with respect to the ways they conform.
These guidelines can be quickly adapted to changing conditions, as was the case when OSFI
altered capital requirements for banks that offered liquidity lines to asset-backed-commercial-
paper conduits well before the ABCP crisis emerged. The flexibility for Canadian regulators to
adapt guidelines in response to financial-market conditions contrasts with the processes in the
U.S., where the regulations based on the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act have still to be completed.
In addition, the legislative framework for financial institutions has a distinctive feature in that
the laws have sunset clauses that require renewal every five years. These renewals have been
the occasion for major reviews of the financial system and its regulation.43 This feature helps to
keep the framework in step with financial-market developments.
Adaptability may not be desirable for all aspects of regulation. In the absence of clear-cut
criteria for determining when a financial institution is deemed to have failed, regulators around
the world have, in the past, delayed taking action to foreclose on failing institutions in the hope
that they might be turned around, leading to larger losses than would have taken place with
earlier intervention.
Simplicity
Simple regulation benefits both the regulated and the regulators through lower costs of
compliance and enforcement. OSFI’s principles-based approach allows greater simplicity than
a rules-based approach to regulation, like that used in the U.S. The differences are substantial:
Table 6 illustrates the difference with respect to one type of provision: securities lending.
Recent U.S. reform initiatives will add further to complexity: the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 runs
to 848 pages and will require a further 400 rules from different regulatory agencies.44 The one-
third of the rules that were completed by July 2012 added 8,838 pages to the rule book.45
42 Alex Blumberg, “The Big Banking Overhaul Most People Haven’t Heard Of,” Planet Money, National Public Radio,
August 20, 2010, http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2010/08/19/129306242/the-finance-overhaul-most-of-us-haven-t-
heard-of.
43 Notable are the 1964 Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (the Porter Commission), which served as a
blueprint for much subsequent financial reform, and the 1998 Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial
Services Sector (the MacKay Task Force).
44 A. Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee” (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th
economic policy symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 31, 2012), 9,
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx.
45 ibid., 10.
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TABLE 6:  PRINCIPLES- AND RULES-BASED REGULATION: A COMPARISON
The difference between principle-based and rules-based regulation can be illustrated by
comparing OSFI’s Guideline B-4: Securities Lending, with the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
Regulation U (Part 221: Credit by banks and Persons Other than Brokers or Dealers for
the Purpose of Purchasing or Carrying Margin Stock). Despite covering all securities
lending, Guideline B4 consists of four pages with five sections, whereas Regulation U
uses 23 pages for 32 sections and is supplemented by Regulation X “Borrowers of
Securities Credit.”  
Guideline B4 advises financial institutions to “ensure that securities lending activities
are conducted in a safe and prudent manner” and makes no mention of the purpose.
Regulation U requires execution of a purpose statement (Form FR U1) for margin loans
against stock except for loans extended under paragraph (c)(2) of the section, and has
sections on “Amendment of purpose statement,” “Special purpose loans to brokers and
dealers,” with 10 subsections together with interpretations on “Determination and
effect of purpose of loan,” “reliance on ‘good faith’ on statement of purpose of loans,”
and a response to a question about “Accepting a purpose statement through the mail
without benefit of face-to-face interview.”  
Guidelines may not always be sufficiently specific to deal with an issue, leading OSFI, in these
cases, to resort to rules. As an example, Advisory: Innovative Tier 1 Capital and Other Capital
clarifications – Revised Version is itself detailed, and refers to a guideline and its appendix,
two advisories, plus another document, The Capital Regime for Regulated Insurance Holding
Companies and Non-operating Life Insurance Companies.
OSFI deserves high marks for relying on a predominantly principles-based approach to
regulation. These choices have saved financial institutions the costs of dealing with detailed
prescriptive rules and also have likely contributed to the strong performance of Canadian
institutions. Recently, however, the adoption of the Basel III capital requirements has shifted
the emphasis away from simplicity and lowers OSFI’s final grade.   
THE SAFETY NET
Financial institutions and their customers are protected by the safety net. The formal part of the
net consists of deposit insurance and other guarantee programs. As the experience of the
financial crisis shows, informal measures including rescues, bail outs and other support have
extended the scope and size of the safety net to dwarf the formal measures. 
The Canadian financial sector now pays for the deposit insurance coverage offered by the
Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC). Recently CDIC has raised its rates
substantially to better reflect the risks involved. In 2011, these premiums were $224 million for
coverage of insured deposits worth over $622 billion, a rate of 0.015 per cent.46
46 This premium rate, for example, would imply a failure rate of one per cent of bank assets per year at a cost of 1.5 per
cent per failure. CDIC charges higher rates to institutions that pose greater risks. 
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Deposit insurance is only a small part of the safety net. Taking account of “too big to fail”
would give a different perspective on the costs of protection: the total assets of the five largest
domestic banks are more than $3.8 trillion. CDIC’s current reserves would cover 1/1470th, and
its annual premium only 1/37,000th of these assets. Despite the increase in CDIC’s fees, they
do not adequately protect the Canadian public from the costs of institutional failure: they have
been based on the scope of its explicit deposit guarantees rather than the “too big to fail”
blanket, which is five times larger. The persistent difference between standalone and overall
credit rating of Canadian banks indicates that deposit-insurance premium levels are at levels
where banks gain an implied subsidy from the safety net.
Some suggest that the confidence-building effects of the government’s guarantees may be
costless. Now that some U.S. institutions are repaying their TARP funds, some authorities,
including former Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner, suggest the program has turned a profit.
This claim has been strongly contested by the special inspector general of the program, who
declared: “[i]t is a widely held misconception that TARP will make a profit.”47 And even if the
funds are repaid, this outcome could not have been assumed. The experiences of the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.K., among others, reinforce the view that guarantees can
be costly. Even if bailouts turn out to be costless in retrospect, they do put the public at risk for
losses that would turn up with a different roll of the dice. 
DEALING WITH FRAGILITY
The fragility of the financial sector and the economic costs of failure pose a challenge for
policy-makers. Not only must they act to prevent fragility, they must deal with instability when
it occurs. During the recent financial crisis, authorities in many countries responded by
reinforcing financial institutions to prevent their failure and to forestall contagion, in effect
deeming institutions “too big to fail.” They may have had little choice, given the
circumstances.  
The international Financial Stability Board has now designated 29 global banks as
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) “whose distress or disorderly failure,
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.”48 These banks, effectively
deemed “too big to fail,” will be required to hold more capital than other banks by 2019. In
addition, national authorities are expected to develop orderly regimes capable of resolving
institutions without risk to taxpayers. Large Canadian banks were not included among the
designated SIFIs. Nevertheless, their significance on a national scale means they are effectively
too big to fail, and may be too big to resolve.
47 Office of the Special Inspector General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Advancing Economic Stability through
Transparency, Coordinated Oversight, and Robust Enforcement, Quarterly Report to Congress, April 25, 2012, 5.  
48 Financial Stability Board, “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” November,
2011.
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TABLE 7: THE COMPLEXITY OF A MAJOR CANADIAN BANK
• Provides back-stop liquidity and credit-enhancement facilities for Special Purpose
Entities — maximum exposure $34 billion
• Exposed trading positions (repo-style transactions and over-the-counter derivatives)
— $300 billion
• Off-balance-sheet obligations (financial guarantees, operating leases and
commitments to extend credit) — $147 billion
• 64 subsidiaries and subsidiaries of subsidiaries
• Foreign currency assets of almost 40 per cent of all assets 
The policy response to the crisis in Canada and other countries makes it clear that large banks
are too big to fail in the sense that governments will step in to preserve them in a crisis. Such
an approach is understandable in that winding up a large bank would be complicated in any
circumstances and even more so in the heat of a crisis. But if big banks are, in fact, judged too-
big-to-fail, policy-makers must ensure that their policies reflect this fact.  
“Too big to fail” can be dealt with by policies  i) that lower the costs of bailouts and rescues
through more effective resolution; and  ii) that minimize the possibility of failure.
All the king’s horses…. effective resolution
Initiatives aimed at reversing the “too big to fail” dilemma, by lowering the costs of
institutional failure, have been gaining support from policy-makers. The G20 has moved
forward with the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes.
The success of reversing “too big to fail” will depend on overcoming the legacy of the past,
especially from the bailouts, mergers, takeovers and other extraordinary measures taken during
the financial crisis.   
Allowing financial institutions to fail in an orderly way has the appeal of strengthening
incentives for stakeholders — uninsured depositors, other creditors and shareholders — to
bolster the governance of financial institutions. Doing so would have the benefit of allowing a
lighter approach to regulation, allowing scope for greater efficiency. These benefits can be
realized only if there is a credible threat that troubled institutions will be allowed to fail and
that any of the costs of failures will be borne by the stakeholders. Following the lesson of
Lehman Brothers and its harmful impact on financial-market conditions, any institutional
failure must be managed in an orderly way. 
To this end, authorities from the G20, the European Union, the United States, and United
Kingdom have proposed that the resolution of large financial institutions could be made more
tractable by requiring the institutions themselves to prepare “living wills,” or plans for the 
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stabilization of troubled institutions and orderly resolution of institutions beyond rescue.49
Living wills would include advance commitments that specify the triggers to initiate action and
the measures to be taken. If successful, they would avoid the financial-market shocks arising
from the failure of major financial institutions. 
Among the problems identified with living wills have been the high costs of preparation and
maintenance, institutional complexity, and the multiple jurisdictions involved with
multinational banks. Further, given the complexity of modern financial institutions, it is hard to
imagine managers devoting the resources needed for an effective roadmap, much less when
their immediate interests are with the survival of their institution. It also seems unrealistic to
rely on plans for winding down an institution that were developed by the managers who
brought that institution to failure. 
There is good reason to question the possibility of reversing “too big to fail” in this way. It
requires authorities to avoid forbearance and to close troubled institutions promptly. But the
lessons from history suggest that forbearance has a strong appeal. Authorities may hope that an
institution, if given time, can overcome its difficulties. They may also hope to avoid fuelling a
financial crisis by not repeating the distress precipitated by the failures of Northern Rock and
Lehman Brothers. Authorities may also be inclined to forbear because shutting institutions may
be perceived as indicating poor regulatory performance.50
Further, any plan to reverse “too big to fail” must be capable of resolving complex institutions
with assets as large as 49 per cent of Canada’s GDP.51 Size is only part of the problem:
complexity and interconnections throughout the financial sector add to the difficulty of
resolving a single institution by increasing the likelihood that multiple institutions require
resolution at the same time. 
The benefits of reversing “too big to fail” depend critically on the credibility of the resolution
process which, in turn, depends on the degree to which the details of the intervention are
prescribed. The present approach set out in OSFI’s Guide to Intervention for Federally on the
Regulated Deposit-Taking Institutions leaves considerable discretion to the authorities in
choosing both the timing and degree of intervention.52 Such discretion seems warranted given
the uncertainties about the resolution of major institutions. It may be appropriate in the heat of
the moment to support institutions rather than attempt a resolution with an uncertain outcome.
Nevertheless, this discretion erodes the credibility of the commitment to reverse “too big to
fail,” leaving the prospect of orderly resolution as an article of faith: there is no possibility for
a test run. Relying on such a reversal without a fail-proof resolution plan could produce the
calamity of light regulation followed by more costly rescues and bailouts. 
49 O. Schmid, “Living wills: Will They Remedy “Too Big To Fail,” Columbia Journal of European Law Online 18
(2012): 69-80, describes the measures undertaken to implement living wills in the U.K. Federal Reserve Regulation
QQ specified the content required for a living will. See:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/reglisting.htm#QQ. The Federal Reserve and FDIC have now released the
public portion of the living wills of 16 large banks at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-
plans/boa-1g-20120702.pdf
50 The failure of a financial institution inevitably creates a stigma, whether justified or not, for financial regulators.
Each of the Canadian banks failures, from the Home Bank in 1924 onward, have accounted for less than one per cent
of the banking-system assets. Yet all have precipitated major public inquiries.  
51 Table 7 illustrates the complexity of a major Canadian bank.
52 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Financial
Institutions.
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Preventing failures
The uncertainties of reversing “too big to fail” can be avoided through recognizing that
circumstances can force authorities, regardless of their prior intent, to rescue and support
troubled financial institutions, and by adopting policies that strengthen financial institutions to
minimize the risk of failure. Among the ways for reducing the need for such rescues and
support are:
i) Limiting activities of financial institutions
ii) Capping the overall size of institutions 
iii) Making institutions safer 
LIMITING ACTIVITIES
Banks serve as underwriters, broker-dealers, insurers, and finance companies, in addition to
performing their traditional banking activities. The crisis in the U.S. demonstrated the
difficulties of supporting core banking activities without rescuing other activities at the same
time. Numerous committees, commissions, regulators and academics have identified the
expansion of banking into other activities as contributing to “too big to fail” and have
advocated isolating core banking activities that are covered by the safety net from an
institution’s other activities.53 These proposals have antecedents dating back to well before the
financial crisis, in the narrow-banking proposals of Milton Friedman and James Tobin, two
Nobel Prize winners from opposite sides of the political spectrum.54 Their proposal would limit
banks to holding only safe assets against their deposits, making deposits at narrow banks
completely safe. Other less drastic proposals would hive off selected activities such as
underwriting and proprietary trading from core activities. 
The separation of selected financial activities suffers from a lack of credibility. During the
ABCP crisis in Canada, OSFI allowed Canadian banks to support their sponsored ABCP
conduits which had been treated as off-balance sheet. This action suggests that the distinction
between on- and off-balance-sheet bank activities was malleable when entities not on the
parent’s balance sheet became distressed. Any such distinction must offer the institution no
room for discretion so as to prevent support for activities beyond the narrow bank. 
The Volcker plan to separate investment banking from commercial banking has been
incorporated into the Dodd-Frank legislation and represented a return to the separation that had
lasted from 1933 through to the 1990s under the Glass-Steagall Act. This act required
“‘complete divorcement’ of commercial and investment banking by prohibiting commercial
banks from engaging in the ‘issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution either
wholesale, or retail or through a syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or
other securities.’”55
53 The President of the Dallas Federal Reserve Bank and a colleague argue that banking entities should be of size that is
“too small to save.” R. Fisher and H. Rosenblum, “Vanquishing Too Big,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Annual
Report, 2012.
54 They have been joined by two other Nobel Prize winners: Robert Merton and Thomas Sargent.
55 J. Markham, “The Subprime Crisis: A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall vs. Gramm, Leach-Bliley,”
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12, 4 (2009): 1092. 
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The experience of the financial crisis raises doubts about the need for separating core banking
from other activities. Canadian banks have combined investment banking with core banking
since the 1980s and were able to weather the crisis better than others. On the other hand,
investment houses at the eye of the storm, such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Merrill
Lynch, were all freestanding institutions independent of commercial banks at the time they ran
into trouble. Moreover, a strict separation will tend to push the non-core activities of banks into
the realm of present-day shadow banking. While such a separation may prevent rescues from
related parties, the size and fragility of the non-core activities may lead to government bailouts
when they run into trouble.
Still, Canadians should avoid being too complacent about the better performance of our
investment banks. It may be that they are inherently more stable than their U.S. counterparts,
but we should not count on it. This performance raises several questions relevant to policy: Did
it result from of their integration with banking institutions? Did these ties with banks affect
their risk-taking, or did it shield them from market pressures? Or, was it a result of character of
their business? If so, would it leave them vulnerable to a different crisis? 
CAPPING THE SIZE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Some have argued that “too big to fail” can be avoided best by limiting the size of banks to a
size where they can fail without disrupting the financial system.56 Johnson and Kwak are very
specific, proposing that that no institution be allowed to have total assets exceeding four per
cent of their home country’s GDP, implying a ceiling of $73 billion for Canadian banks.57 At
present, Royal Bank’s assets stand at more than 11 times the proposed ceiling and those of
National Bank, the smallest of the Big Six, at more than two-and-a-half times. Imposing a
ceiling to the size of Canadian banks runs the risk of losing the benefits of the current structure
of the financial system. Smaller banks may be unable to maintain the current nation-wide
branching systems that have contributed to the stability of Canada’s financial system.58
SAFER INSTITUTIONS
Capital requirements and leverage ratios create buffers protecting the creditors of financial
institutions and have been one of the primary instruments used to assure the soundness of
financial institutions. Making institutions safer through higher capital levels also has advantage
over using resolution plans because of their sequencing. A resolution plan can be a backup if
strengthened capital proves to be inadequate to prevent an institution from failing. In contrast,
failure of the resolution plan would leave losses to be absorbed by the public. This difference,
plus the limitations of resolution plans, suggests the emphasis should be placed on capital
standards for dealing with banks that are too big to fail. 
56 See: S. Johnson and J. Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2010); and N. Roubini and S. Mihm, Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Finance
(London: Penguin Press, 2010).
57 Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers.
58 See M. Bordo. H. Rockoff, and A. Reddish, “Why did n’t Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907
or…?)” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17312, August 2011.
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Research by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision suggests there are net benefits from
raising capital requirements: the savings expected from reducing the frequency and costs of
future crises exceed the costs to the economy from higher bank-capital requirements. Overall,
its findings suggest that raising the capital ratio from eight to nine per cent would reduce the
expected costs of financial crises by 0.60 per cent of GDP at an expense of just 0.13 per cent
from the costs of the higher bank capital.59 
Canadian authorities already have a track record of going beyond international standards with
respect to capital requirements. The Financial Stability Board notes that from 1999 onwards,
OSFI had required banks and trust and loan companies to maintain capital in excess of the
Basel II standards and to require a higher proportion of shareholder equity in their capital.60
OSFI also subjected deposit-taking institutions to an asset-to-capital ratio that limited their
leverage. Both these measures contributed to the Financial Stability Board’s approval of
OSFI’s adoption of “regulatory policies that go beyond international minimum standards.”61
OSFI has now announced that Canada’s six largest banks have been designated as being of
domestic systemic importance on the basis of their “size, interconnectedness, substitutability
and complexity” and will be subject to a one-per-cent risk-weighted capital surcharge by 2016,
well before the Basel III target of 2019.62
The question remains as to how much capital institutions should hold. Conceptually, they
should hold capital to the point that eliminates any subsidy from the safety net and its cost to
taxpayers. There may be some distance to go: Canadian banks are rated on a standalone basis
lower by credit-rating agencies than they are when the government’s backstop is taken into
account (Table 8). Twenty-six leading academics have argued that “ensuring that banks are
funded with significant more equity should be a key element of effective regulatory reform.”63
Some even suggest that capital requirements should be as high as 20 per cent.64
TABLE 8: RATINGS OF LARGE CANADIAN BANKS (AS OF FEBRUARY 22, 2013)
Source: Moody’s.
59 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, An assessment of the longer-term
economic impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements (August 2010), 29. 
60 Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of Canada, Review report (January 2012).
61 ibid., 6.
62 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Guide to Intervention for Federally Regulated Financial
Institutions.
63
“Healthy Banking system is the Goal, not Profitable Banks,” Letter published in the Financial Times (November 9,
2010).
64 A. Admati and M. Hellwig, What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2013). 
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Bank of Montreal C+ Aa3
Toronto-Dominion B Aa1
Bank of Nova Scotia B- Aa2
CIBC C+ Aa3
Royal Bank C+ Aa3
Bank Financial strength Long-Term Rating
(Stand-alone basis) (Supported basis)
REGULATION AND EFFICIENCY
Efficiency in the short run refers to the ability of the financial sector to transfer funds from
suppliers to users of funds and direct them to their most productive uses and, as in other
industries, is fostered by existence of competition. Nevertheless, overriding concern for
stability of the industry may lead to policies that could conflict with efficiency. Measures such
as capital requirements and activity restrictions may appear to reduce efficiency by precluding
financial institutions from undertaking activities that are beneficial to their customers and
profitable for themselves in the short run. Similarly, they may be prevented from realizing
economies of scale from restrictions on mergers. 
A longer-run perspective must take account of the sustainability of the financial-sector
arrangements. A financial system can be efficient in the short run, but this efficiency will be
lost if it is unstable in the longer run. Stability fosters the confidence necessary for the success
of the system: without it, individuals would be less willing to entrust their funds to financial
institutions and borrowers will lose their access to credit. From a longer-run perspective, the
key issue is not whether stability measures conflict with efficiency, but rather whether the
measures chosen to maintain stability are the least-cost combination in terms of efficiency.
Regulatory approach
On the whole, the Canadian broadly principles-based approach has minimized the impact of
regulation on efficiency. While the Bank Act does restrict banks to the business of banking and
the Insurance Act similarly restricts insurance companies to providing financial services, the
respective acts specify a host of other permitted activities.65 The manner in which institutions
perform these activities is generally governed by broad guidelines directed toward assuring
practices that are compatible with safety and soundness. In sum, the framework allows
institutions greater scope for their business practices than in other countries and in the past. 
OSFI AND PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
The measures to enhance capital requirements in the Basel III agreements have shifted the
emphasis of regulation away from principles toward prescriptive rules and greater complexity.
Haldane points out that the documentation for capital requirements in the U.S. and U.K. has
mushroomed from the less than 20 pages for Basel I to over 1000 pages for Basel III.66 In the
same vein, McKinsey & Company estimate the implementation cost of regulatory compliance
for a midsize European bank of $68 to $110 million together with an additional 135 and 210
employee FTE years.67 Added to these direct costs to the banks must be the costs incurred by
the regulators which in the end are charged back to the regulated and ultimately to their
65 They do prohibit financial institutions from dealing in goods or engaging in any other trade or business without
approval. See Bank Act, sections 409 and 410, and the Insurance Companies Act, Section 440 and 441.
66 A. Haldane and V. Madouros, The Dog and the Frisbee, in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, The Changing
Policy Landscape, Jackson Hole Policy Symposium, 2012, p.122.
67 McKinsey & Company, Basel III and European banking: Its impact, how banks might respond, and the challenges of
implementation (November 2010), p.22.
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customers. The costs of compliance could be justified if it was necessary for the safety of the
financial system. Evidence suggests, however, that simpler leverage ratios protect stability
more effectively than complex capital ratios such as those in Basel III.68
FINTRAC AND ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
International anti-money laundering efforts are coordinated by the Financial Action Task Force
(FAFT), an international body that sets and promotes standards for national agencies in their
fight against money laundering. It describes itself as a “‘policy making body’ which works to
generate the necessary political will to bring about legislative and regulatory reforms” for this
purpose. FAFT bases its approach to anti-money laundering on its “40+9” recommendations.69
FAFT continually monitors members’ progress in great detail and has evaluated Canada’s AML
regime three times since the adoption of the rules in 1990. It has performed six follow-up
reports to its latest evaluation before agreeing to remove Canada from the regular follow-up
procedure. The final follow-up in 2014 by itself consisted of over 45 pages.
Canada’s anti-money-laundering efforts are administered by the Financial Transaction and
Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) which depends on the record keeping and
reporting of financial institutions and other entities. In 2013 reporting entities transmitted
almost 20 million transactions reports to FINTRAC which, in turn, referred 919 actionable
cases to authorities for further investigation.
Two recent reports have been critical of FINTRAC’s operations. The Privacy Commissioner
has reviewed its data requests and has judged them to exceed to exceed the information
relevant for FINTRAC’s own purposes.70 The Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce has commented about the lack of indicators for judging its performance and has
urged it to demonstrate “value for money.”71 This request, though a step in the right direction,
does not deal with the real costs of anti-money laundering. Confining concern to just value for
money fails to recognize that the agency’s $50 million budget understates the overall cost by
neglecting the costs imposed on financial institutions, costs that may overshadow the
government’s budgetary cost. In responding to the Committee’s request, FINTRAC should
demonstrate its value for its overall cost including to reporting entities. 
68 Haldane, op. cit., 13-14; A. Demirguc-Kunt, A. Detragiache and O. Merrouche, “Bank capital: lessons from the
financial crisis“ (Policy Research Working Paper series 5473, World Bank, 2010); and A. Estrella, S. Park and S.
Peristiani, “Capital rations as predictors of bank failure,” Economic Policy Review 6, 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of
New York: February 2000): 33-52.
69 See FAFT, International Standards on combatting Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation
for the 40 money laundering recommendations and FAFT, FAFT IX Special Recommendations for the 9 terrorism
financing recommendations.  
70 See Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre: Audit Report of the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, 2013.
71 Senate of Canada, Following the Money: Is Canada Making Progress in Combatting Money Laundering and Terrorist
Financing? Not Really, Report of the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, March 2013.
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FINTRAC should now have sufficient experience to review its information needs with a view
toward paring its information and record keeping demands to those that are essential to its
purpose. A good first step would be consultation with law enforcement agencies to determine
exactly which information has contributed to their investigations. While such a paring may
appear to put Canada offside with FAFT’s rule-based approach, FAFT itself has announced a
shift in emphasis away from procedures towards results in assessing performance of AML
regimes. Canadian authorities should encourage this shift and take advantage of it to streamline
its operations.
FATCA AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE
The U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) of 2010, enacted to assure tax
compliance by U.S. citizens and residents, has added a further layer to Canadian financial
regulation. FACTA requires non U.S. financial institutions to agree to identify U.S. accounts
and report information about transactions in these accounts to the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Failure to enter into an agreement with the IRS would subject financial institutions to a
30% withholding tax on certain payments. 
The impact of FATCA on financial institutions and their customers has been lessened from
what it could have been by an intergovernmental agreement that i) makes compliance conform
to Canadian privacy laws by allowing financial institutions to report to the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA) instead of the IRS and ii) exempts a variety of registered accounts, including
registered retirement saving plans, registered pension plans and tax-free savings accounts,
among others, from the reporting. Even with these changes, compliance with FATCA requires
Canadian banks to identify relevant customers and report their transactions to CRA. Even so,
FACTA’s extraterritorial conscription of Canadian institutions to be agents for U.S. tax
collection imposes significant costs to the institutions and their customers.
Efficiency and size
The government’s rejection of two proposed bank mergers in 1998, and a subsequent merger
between a life insurer and a bank, may have come at the expense of the operational efficiency
of the banking system. The decisions on the bank mergers were made with the benefit of
reviews by the Competition Bureau and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions. The bureau suggested that the unfavourable competitive effects would require
divestment from several lines of business.72 The superintendent expressed concerns about the
difficulties of stabilizing a merged bank if it ran into trouble. In particular, a rescue through its
sale to, or merger with, a foreign institution could limit the ability of regulators to assure its
future stability, and a resolution involving another large domestic institution would raise
competition concerns.73
72 The Competition Bureau’s letter to the Royal Bank and the Bank of Montreal, and the Competition Bureau’s letter to
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Toronto-Dominion Bank (December 14, 1998). 
73 Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, “Report to the Minister of Finance: Proposed mergers between
the Royal Bank of Canada and the Bank of Montreal, and the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Toronto-
Dominion Bank” (December 1998).
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A number of economic studies for Canada and elsewhere indicate that there are economies of
scale to be realized by larger bank size in the short run.74 These studies may, however, be less
relevant in the longer run. The limited span of the data used for these studies may not capture
the “fat tail” events than can swamp relationships derived on normal times. They may also fail
to take account of the reality that lower costs of funds for large banks may be the result of their
“too big to fail” status. Most important, econometric studies, despite capturing technical
efficiencies, are less likely to capture the less tangible aspects, such as governance, which may
be as vital or more so in determining the performance of large banks over the longer run.
Governance problems of big banks arising from their complexity may swamp technical
efficiency over the longer run.75 A bank may carry out its actions efficiently, but this efficiency
may not counteract the effects of making wrong choices. 
The severe impact of the financial crisis on some of the world’s largest banks casts a new light
on the consequences of bank size in the longer run. The market value of the private stakes in
the five largest U.S. banks by the end of 2008 had shrunk to just one quarter of its 2004 value,
leading some observers to question whether they even remained solvent.76,77 Similarly,
Japanese banks dominated world banking through the 1980s, accounting for the top six
positions among world banks in terms of assets. By 2005, the top Japanese banks ranked 6th,
15th and 18th, despite each being combinations of at least two former top 10 banks. Together
the recent performance of “mega-banks” and the Japanese experience suggests that the
evidence of benefits from greater bank size needs to be treated with caution. 
Innovation and efficiency
Over the long run, innovation is vital to the efficiency of the financial industry and the
economy as a whole. Given the role of information in the provision of financial services, much
innovation has taken place in the industry in light of technological advances, especially in
computing and telecommunications. Innovation can also be induced by regulation as financial
institutions seek to minimize the regulatory impact on their business. Table 9 shows some
recent financial innovations.
74 J. Allan and Y. Liu, “Efficiency and economies of scale of large Canadian banks,” Canadian Journal of Economics,
40, 1 (2007): 225-244; and J. McIntosh, “A welfare analysis of Canadian chartered bank mergers,” Canadian Journal
of Economics 35, 3 (2002): 457-475.
75 The experience of Robert Rubin at Citibank offers insight into complexity and governance in large banks. A former
co-chairman of Goldman Sachs and former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin was exceptionally qualified to
participate in the running of a major bank and served as a director and special advisor to the CEO. After the
breakdown of Citibank, Rubin declared “the board can’t run the risk book of a company” and “the board as a whole
is not going to have a granular knowledge” of operations. Despite their positions, Rubin, other board members and
even senior managers appear to have been too detached from the bank’s activities to protect it from massive losses.
76 Market capitalization is derived from the Data Page at: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.
77 See: L. Bebchek, “Near-Sighted Stress Tests,” Forbes.com, May 20, 2009.
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TABLE 9: RECENT FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS
Source: Based on R. Litan, “In Defense of Much, But Not All, 
Financial Innovation” (Washington: Brookings Institution, Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0217_financial_innovation_litan.aspx.
Judging financial innovation by the “do no harm” principle sets a high standard that could be
met by few innovations. Automobiles improved mobility while destroying buggy-making jobs,
adding pollution and killing more people than guns.
Some financial innovations have mainly beneficial effects. Despite Paul Volcker’s quip that the
ATM was the last valuable new banking product, others, such as debit and credit cards and
electronic banking, have added convenience and lowered costs in making payments with few
drawbacks. Innovations induced by regulation can also be beneficial: the development of
money market funds offered holders of small savings relief from an ill-judged cap on savings-
deposit rates imposed by Regulation Q, where regulatory reform was blocked by vested
interests. Other innovations had mixed effects. Securitization has generally improved terms for
both savers and investors. Still, a mutant form became the toxic asset that triggered Canada’s
ABCP crisis. 
Finally, some innovations have few redeeming virtues. The Certificate of Deposit Account
Registry Service, a scheme involving over 3,000 U.S. financial institutions, allows holders of
large money balances to divide them among deposits at numerous financial institutions,
effectively subverting the intent of deposit insurance. Similarly, regulatory capital trades allow
banks to reduce their required capital by acquiring third-party insurance against loan losses.
This device has recently allowed a major U.S. bank to buy capital insurance from an
unregulated company set up by a large private-equity firm, effectively placing part of the
bank’s capital outside the scope of regulation and leaves it subject to an opaque counterparty of
the type that aggravated the financial crisis.78
78 See: Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Liam Vaughan and Ben Moshinsky, “Blackstone profits from regulation with
Citigroup deal,” Bloomberg, February 27, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-28/blackstone-profits-
from-regulation-with-citigroup-deal.html.
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Payments ATMs
Credit-card expansion
Debit cards
E-banking
Mobile payments
Pre-paid cards
Lending Credit-card expansion
Credit-scoring
Adjustable-rate mortgages
Home-equity lines of credit
Reverse mortgages
Securitization
Investment Daily interest saving accounts
Money market funds
Indexed mutual funds
Exchange traded funds
Asset-backed securities
Interest/currency swaps
Credit default swaps
Regulation Money market funds
Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service (CDARS) 
Regulatory capital trades (synthetic securitizations)
These differences among innovations cause headaches for regulators. Regulators need to avoid
standing in the way of beneficial innovations while simultaneously being prepared to act when
they detect potentially harmful innovations or the morphing of beneficial processes or products
into harmful ones. Innovation thrives in an environment where the bias leans toward
permission rather than prohibition. OSFI’s principles-based regulation provides some assurance
to financial institutions that their plans for innovation will receive the benefit of the doubt,
allowing acceptable innovations without the complications and delays of rule changes. At the
same time, it allows regulators to step in to halt or reverse harmful innovations and limit the
misuse of others. Finance Canada has taken advantage of this flexibility to issue directives
governing the practices of credit- and debit-card suppliers. On the whole, Canada’s principles-
based approach has been supportive of innovation. 
Innovation and payments79
Canada has lagged behind other countries with respect to innovation in the payments sector.
Advances in technology and communication have transformed the ways in which payments are
made to the extent that virtually all payments have become electronic in some countries. While
Canada’s consumers rank among the leaders in the use of electronic payments, Canadian
businesses and governments write approximately one-billion cheques a year, accounting for 60
per cent of their payments, compared to less than 10 per cent in other countries.80 McKinsey
estimates that Canadians could save as much as $7 billion a year from the reduced use of paper
payments.81
Businesses continue to use cheques, in part, because the limited information-capacity on
electronic transactions prevents the seamless integration of payments data with enterprise
accounting. The current organization of the clearing and settlement system hinders change by
relying on bilateral exchanges among the clearing members which require members’ systems to
be harmonized with the diverse systems of all others.82 A hub-and-spoke clearing arrangement
would facilitate technological advancement by allowing participants to co-ordinate their
systems with only a single counterparty at the hub. Major financial institutions now have little
incentive to move to a hub-and-spoke arrangement because of considerable required
investment with little prospect of gaining a competitive advantage. The Task Force on the
Future of the Canadian Payments System recommended reorganization of the core of the
payments system under an independent body mandated to construct a hub-and-spoke
arrangement for clearing and settlement and to advance technology to meet the informational
requirements of businesses.
79 In the interests of full disclosure, the author has been a director of the Canadian Payments Association and,
subsequently, a member of the Task Force for Payments System Review.
80 Task Force for Payment System Review, Going Digital: Transitioning to Digital Payments (2011), 21,
http://paymentsystemreview.ca/wp-content/themes/psr-esp-hub/documents/r03_eng.pdf.
81 ibid., 17.
82 A survey of payments systems showed that multilateral systems outperformed bilateral systems with respect to speed
of final settlement, automated posting from a clearing to a settlement system, and remittance standards for straight-
through processing for business-to-business payments. See: Canadian Payments Association, International Research
and Benchmarking Survey Results – Core Systems (February 2009),
http://www.cdnpay.ca/imis15/pdf/pdfs_publications/payments_strategy_intl_core_systems.pdf.
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Fostering competition
The segments of the Canadian financial system differ with respect to the number of
competitors and the degree of concentration. While over 400 insurers are active in the
property- and casualty-insurance industry, and 94 operate in the life insurance industry,
competition in deposit-taking has been a continual concern for Canadian policy-makers. Five
large banks account for 86 per cent of banking assets and 79 per cent of deposit-taking as a
whole. Competition has been constrained by the need for safety and soundness and has been
subject to entry barriers against both domestic enterprises and foreign institutions.
The barriers to entry for new domestic banks have been eased progressively as regulators have
eliminated the need for banks to be incorporated through an act of Parliament, lowered the
initial capital requirements, and have permitted banks with less than $12 billion in equity to be
controlled by a single interest. At present, some 15 smaller domestic banks compete with the
Big Five banks. Despite the number of other banks, the Big Five banks still account for the
bulk of total bank assets. Even though smaller domestic banks compete with the large banks in
some sectors, they are likely to remain a source of limited competition because of challenges to
their growth.83
Caisses populaire and credit unions account for 13 per cent of the deposit-taking in Canada,
and have competed vigorously with banks in terms of services and products. They have been
pioneers with respect to such innovations as daily interest chequing, debit card and ATM
networks, hours of operation, electronic imaging for cheques, and mobile cheque deposit. The
federal government has recently strengthened the potential competition from these institutions
by making it possible for credit unions to become federally incorporated and gain the broader
powers of federal institutions, including offering services beyond their home province.84
Foreign bank subsidiaries were first permitted to operate in Canada as a further source of
competition under the 1980 Bank Act that subjected their activities to a number of restrictions
including limits on bank size, a cap on the total size of the foreign-subsidiary sector, and limits
to branching, which have all been subsequently relaxed. Twenty-four foreign bank subsidiaries
now hold $127 billion in Canadian assets, a three-per-cent share of the total banking market.
HSBC, the largest foreign bank subsidiary, has now grown to $82 billion in assets.85 Foreign
bank subsidiaries, like new domestic banks, must confront challenges to growth, including the
need to establish all the corporate trappings such as boards and management.
Since 1999 foreign banks have also been able to operate directly in Canada through full-service
branches that have limited powers to accept deposits. Twenty-three banks have taken advantage
of this opportunity and hold $62 billion in assets. An additional category, comprised of four
lending branches that conduct more limited activities, have total assets of $3.9 billion. Foreign
banks could also enter Canada by acquiring a domestic bank, which is currently only possible
for a target bank with less than $12 billion in equity. 
83 Historically, banks have grown large from takeovers and mergers. Some of the smaller banks that entered the market
in the 1980s foundered on the basis of overly ambitious expansion plans that exposed them to excessive risk.
84 S. Clark, K. Zaman and V. Graham, “New Proposed Regulations for Credit Unions – A Step Closer to a Federal
Regime” (Toronto: Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP, July, 2012), http://www.osler.com/NewsResources/New-
Proposed-Regulations-for-Federal-Credit-Unions-A-Step-Closer-to-a-Federal-Regime/.
85 ING, one of the largest foreign-owned banks was recently sold to a domestic bank, because of its parent’s troubles.
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A foreign bank takeover of a failing major bank offers an alternative to further bank
consolidation that avoids further concentration in the deposit-taking sector. Such a takeover
would need to satisfy certain conditions to protect Canadians: i) It must come from a
jurisdiction with a strong regulatory regime; ii) its home-country authorities must commit to
offering deposit insurance comparable to Canadian levels; and iii) they must grant Canadian
creditors equal status to home-country creditors in case of failure. In practice, the financial
crisis has raised doubts whether another country’s regulatory regime would satisfy the first
condition. The U.S. Federal Reserve, which had allowed foreign banks to operate in the U.S.,
has recently proposed that foreign banks with significant U.S. operations would now be
required to organize as a separate U.S. holding company and meet its risk-based capital and
leverage requirements.86
CANADIAN FINANCIAL REGULATION: A REPORT CARD
It would be tempting to grade the performance of Canadian financial regulation on the basis of
the strength of Canadian institutions during the crisis. That would be like judging the quality of
a school on its success in a spelling bee. Would they have won if the final word had not been
“incunabula”? In addition, no financial crisis is the same. Would Canadian institutions have
fared so well with a different throw of the dice? The school should be judged on its foundation
of curriculum and quality of instruction. By the same token, Canadian financial regulation
should be judged on its institutional framework and the regulator’s performance within the
framework. 
Canada’s framework for regulation provides a sound foundation; there are clear lines of
accountability. While other agencies, both federal and provincial, are responsible for market
conduct and regulation of markets, OSFI has sole responsibility for prudential regulation of
banks, life insurers and property and casualty insurers. Minimal overlap arises from the Bank
of Canada’s responsibility for clearing and settlement systems and CDIC’s responsibilities for
resolution. The emphasis on principles versus rules has also been a strength, giving both
institutions and regulators the flexibility to respond to developments in the financial system. 
OSFI has not been afraid to move ahead of the pack in the face of a need for unpopular moves.
It has consistently maintained higher capital requirements than have most other national
regulators, and was one of the few national regulators to supplement capital requirements with
a leverage cap. OSFI also moved quickly to shield Canadian banks from their exposure to
third-party issuers of ABCP.
Finally, Canadian authorities have been heedful of keeping regulation from interfering with the
efficiency of the financial sector. Recent measures, however, have added to the burden of
regulation for the financial sector. The introduction of Basel III has increased the complexity of
regulation with no apparent benefit relative to simpler leverage ratios; anti-money laundering
efforts have added yet another administrative burden, and the extraterritorial extension of U.S.
tax law has coerced Canadian financial institutions into enforcing its application. Each of these
initiatives has come at the expense of the efficiency of financial institutions in meeting
Canadians financial needs.
86 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Press Release, December 14, 2012.
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With respect to competition, some argument could be made in the case of the proposed bank
mergers that stability trumped short-run efficiency. A succession of other measures, however,
have been directed to improving efficiency through fostering competition. Some measures such
as allowing non-deposit-taking institutions greater scope in the Canadian payments system,
allowing foreign banks to operate lending branches, and creating federal co-operative financial
institutions through retail associations may not have met expectations. Still, these results
should not discourage further innovation: the success of initiatives cannot always be judged in
advance. Other efforts have been more successful. Closely held banks have increased
competition for personal savings and the proposals for federal credit unions will allow them to
escape the confines of their home province.
The superior performance of Canadian institutions in the financial crisis did not take place by
chance. It was the consequence of financial institutions operating within a well-grounded
regulatory and supervisory system that was free from the politicization that has tainted the U.S.
system.87 Even so, the crisis did cause authorities to take extraordinary measures to bolster
confidence. The crisis was largely unexpected and, unfortunately, its features provide limited
insight about future crises because crises are not all alike. Though the crisis, beginning in 2007,
was triggered by troubles in American housing finance, it was the collapse of the energy
market in the late 1980s that toppled over 400 Texas banks, and it was the difficulties of a
hedge fund, Long-term Capital Management, that required drastic actions to avert a full-
fledged crisis in 1998. The recent crisis has revealed additional threats to stability from outside
the regulated financial sector in the form of shadow banking and over-the-counter derivatives.
Though regulators have made progress in dealing with these issues, much remains to be done. 
Canadian regulators are part of a class of international regulators who jointly develop
initiatives to maintain stability of financial systems. The class, as a whole, has spent too much
attention on how to pick up the pieces of financial failures and not enough on how to prevent
this breakage in the first place. Certainly authorities need to shore up resolution procedures
because troubled institutions will always be with us. But orderly resolution of large financial
entities during the heat of a financial crisis may be little more than a hope. Financial
institutions need to be regulated and supervised in a way that makes failure a remote
possibility. Higher capital standards will be needed as long as the standalone credit rating of
Canadian banks fall short of their ratings that reflect their government backstop.
87 See Calomiris and Haber, Fragile by Design, which argues that differences in the political systems between Canada
and the U.S. explain the absence of politicization of financial regulation in Canada.
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• Building capacity in Government through the formal training of public servants in degree and non-degree
programs, giving the people charged with making public policy work for Canada the hands-on expertise to represent
our vital interests both here and abroad;
• Improving Public Policy Discourse outside Government through executive and strategic assessment
programs, building a stronger understanding of what makes public policy work for those outside of the public sector
and helps everyday Canadians make informed decisions on the politics that will shape their futures;
• Providing a Global Perspective on Public Policy Research through international collaborations, education,
and community outreach programs, bringing global best practices to bear on Canadian public policy, resulting in
decisions that benefit all people for the long term, not a few people for the short term.
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RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: FINDING LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/energy-efficiency-finding-leadership-opportunities
William D. Rosehart and Hamidreza Zareipour | February 2014
SHOULD CANADA WORRY ABOUT A RESOURCE CURSE?
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/should-canada-worry-about-resource-curse
Alan Gelb | January 2014
PRIORITIZING DEFENCE INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES: LESSONS FOR CANADA FROM AUSTRALIA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/prioritizing-defence-industry-capabilities-lessons-canada-australia
Craig Stone | January 2014
THE VALUE OF CAREGIVER TIME: COSTS OF SUPPORT AND CARE FOR INDIVIDUALS LIVING WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/value-caregiver-time-costs-support-and-care-individuals-living-autism-spectrum-disorder
Carolyn Dudley and Herbert Emery | January 2014
HOW A GUARANTEED ANNUAL INCOME COULD PUT FOOD BANKS OUT OF BUSINESS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/how-guaranteed-annual-income-could-put-food-banks-out-business
Herbert Emery, Valerie Fleisch and Lynn McIntyre | December 2013
CANADIAN DEFENCE COMMITMENTS: OVERVIEW AND STATUS OF SELECTED ACQUISITIONS AND INITIATIVES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/canadian-defence-commitments-overview-and-status-selected-acquisitions-and-initiatives
Elinor Sloan | December 2013
2013 ANNUAL GLOBAL TAX COMPETITIVENESS RANKING: CORPORATE TAX POLICY AT A CROSSROADS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/2013-annual-global-tax-competitiveness-ranking-corporate-tax-policy-crossroads
Duanjie Chen and Jack Mintz | November 2013
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE TRADING SYSTEM: AFTER DOHA AND DOHA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/climate-change-and-trading-system-after-doha-and-doha
Dan Ciuriak and Natassia Ciuriak | November 2013
THE TIMING AND DIRECTION OF STATUTORY TAX RATE CHANGES BY THE CANADIAN PROVINCES 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/timing-and-direction-statutory-tax-rate-changes-canadian-provinces-technical-paper
Ebenezer Adjeic, Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | November 2013
PROVINCIAL TAX RATE ADJUSTMENTS IN CANADA (COMMUNIQUÉ)
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/provincial-tax-rate-adjustments-canada-communiqué
Ebenezer Adjeic, Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | November 2013
THE FISCAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS OF FEELING BETTER AND LIVING LONGER
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/fiscal-social-and-economic-dividends-feeling-better-and-living-longer
J.C. Herbert Emery, Ken Fyie, Ludovic Brunel and Daniel J. Dutton | June 2013
